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GREGORY A. FALLS AND DEBRA DRECNIK WORDEN

Consumer Valuation of
Protection from Creditor Remedies
This study investigates the values comumers place on restrictions of
creditor remedies. The unique data employed were derived from a 1979
consumer survey taken across four local credit markets that differed
significantly in their legal environments. The results of binomial logit
analysis identified the characteristics of consumers who were willing to
pay for contractual protection from several creditor remedies. A study of
the dollar amounts that consumers were inclined to pay provided few
significant results•

.One aspect of the legal environment for consumer credit is the
restrictions placed on remedies that creditors may use to collect delinquent and defaulted debts. A major change in this legal setting
occurred on March 1, 1985 when, after ten years of rule making, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published its Credit Practice Rule.
The regulation prohibits consumer credit contracts from including
confessions of judgment, waivers that exempt certain property from
creditor's claims, the assignment of future wages, the non purchase
money security interests in household goods. It also bans the
pyramiding of late charges. This ruling affects finance companies,
retailers, and federal credit unions. The Federal Reserve Board and
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board adopted similar provisions for
other financial institutions, effective January l, 1986. 1 While a number of studies have examined the importance of remedies to creditors
(see, for example, Dunkelberg 1978; Greer 1973; Peterson 1977; and
Peterson and Frew 1977), very little research has focused on the con-
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'Both the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board were required to
adopt similar Credit Practice Rules, unless they could assert that the relevant practices were not
unfair or deceptive as engaged in by banks and saving institutions, respectively. Various issues
or the Washington Credit Letter (1984 and 1985) discuss these rulings and compare the three
versions.

sumers' view of these procedures, even though it is the consumer
whose "rights" are supposedly protected by the remedy restrictions. 2
Analysis begun by Peterson and Falls (1981) and continued by
Peterson (1986) attempted to show that creditors do consider consumers' attitudes about collection procedures. Both studies posited
that a "goodwill" effect in the marketplace discourages creditors
from using remedies that are unpopular with current or potential
clientele. Only if the return provided by the remedy in the collection
process is greater than the "goodwill" loss will the creditor invoke a
remedy greatly disliked by consumers. Thus, it was concluded that it
is not necessary for the majority of consumers to eliminate all
remedies from credit contracts through legislative action or to bargain directly with creditors to eliminate specific remedies.
While these two works examined the behavior of creditors
given consumer attitudes regarding remedies, this analysis more
closely examines consumer valuation of protection from this type of
creditor action. In particular, we compare those consumers who
derive positive values from protection with those who derive none.
Consumers in this latter group may be injured by mandated restrictions on remedies, because creditors adjust prices and other credit
terms when freedom to invoke remedies is removed. A recent study
by Barth, Cordes, and Yezer (1986) concluded that such restrictions
are unlikely to provide net benefits (defined as the change in consumer welfare from the increase in the demand for credit net of the
decrease in supply) to the typical borrower. Although the approach
used here is quite different from that of Barth, Cordes, and Yezer, a
limited comparison is made later.
The next section introduces the framework for modeling consumer
valuation of protection from creditor remedies. In the third section
measures of the factors discussed are introduced, and the model is
empirically tested. The last section contains concluding remarks.

'Disagreeing with a portion ofcfhe Credit Practice Rule, the American Financial Services
Association filed suit against the FTC. The court, finding for the FTC, concluded that the use
of the disputed remedies would "result in or create a significant risk of substantial economic
and monetary harm to consumers as well as potential deprivations of their legal rights."
Washington Credit Letter, August 5, 1985.

CONSUMER VALUATION MODEL

Shay (1979) discussed negotiation between creditors and debtors in
consumer credit contracts. Typically, negotiation is focused on contractual terms such as finance rates, loan maturity, and sales of
credit insurance, but not on the actions the creditor can take to
recover all or part of the debt in the event of default. In fact, a credit
contract usually refers to only some of these remedies and, in the
event of default, a whole range of legal action not specified in the
contract is available to creditors-under conditions specified by law.
Bargaining does not typically occur for such noncontractual items,
nor is it even customary to bargain over provisions of standardized
contracts. The existence of transactions and information costs leads
to the development of such contracts and dissuades individual
negotiation.
But the heterogeneity of consumers implies that there also are costs
to standardized contracts. Since the preferences and default risks of
consumers differ, benefits from individualized contracts can be
derived by both creditors and debtors. For example, a borrower who
recognizes higher default risk because of uncertain future income
may prefer a contract with a lower interest rate (and smaller payments) and a security lien on household goods. Another individual
may receive the benefits of a continuing relationship with the creditor
that extends from deposit accounts and investments to loans. In these
instances and others a standardized contract may not be optimal, and
negotiating contract terms could yield positive net benefits to the parties involved, in spite of transactions and information costs.
Government regulation of credit terms is also a form of contract
standardization. In examining the regulatory reform of creditor
remedies, Shay (1979) defined the invoking of remedies as a property
right for creditors and protection from them as the debtors' right.
Referring to Demsetz's (1966) analysis of government intervention in
the reassignment of property rights, Shay accepted the proposition
that there are instances when such intervention is desirable. For
example, if the cost of defining and exchanging rights inhibits
negotiation. It is recognized that regulatory restrictions on credit
terms or remedies affect the allocation of a scarce resource-credit.
This occurs through changes in the prices and terms under which
credit is granted and to whom it is granted. Thus, before deciding
that intervention is called for, those consumers who value such

restrictions should be identified and, if possible, the amount of that
value determined.
Johnson (1978) analyzed the cost and benefits of creditor remedies
for both creditors and consumers. He suggested that the amount a
consumer would be willing to pay for protection from a particular
remedy is a good measure of the value derived from restrictions
imposed on that remedy. This analysis begins by examining the determinants of this value, using the framework developed by Johnson.
Assume that in the process of obtaining credit, consumers may
choose to purchase from creditors insurance that guards them from
specific remedies imposed in response to delinquency or default. For
simplicity, assume the cost of such insurance takes the form of a onetime payment made at the beginning of the loan and also that there
are no transactions or information costs to defining, exchanging, and
enforcing the agreement. In return for the premium, the creditor
agrees not to exercise the particular remedy to which the insurance
applies. The size of the premium that a consumer would be willing to
pay would depend on the benefit derived from the insurance. This
benefit (B) is the expected present value of the loss that would be
incurred if the creditor exercised the remedy but is avoided due to the
insurance protection. For expository purposes it may be written as:
B = (PrD) (L) (DIS),

(1)

where PrD is the debtor's subjective probability of delinquency or
default, L is the value of the loss incurred when the remedy is exercised, and DIS is a factor needed to discount the future loss to the
present. 3
Presumably, an individual who believed there was a zero probability of ever defaulting on a credit contract would receive no benefit
from remedy insurance. A greater benefit would be perceived from
insurance the more the consumer believed in the likelihood of having
trouble repaying the debt. In other words, an increase in the debtor's
subjective probability of delinquency or default, PrD, directly
increases the expected present value of the loss incurred without
insurance and thus increases the amount the debtor is willing to pay
for protection.
0

•

'This presentation is similar to Johnson's framework. See Exhibit I of the Appendix for a
simple numerical example.

The loss due to the imposition of a creditor remedy, L, is composed of several parts. One is the actual monetary loss which may
include such items as the market value of repossessed collateral or
claimed household goods, the amount of a deficiency judgment
placed on the consumer, late fees, or assessed attorney's fees. An
increase in any of these values, including the amount outstanding at
the time of default, increases the benefit derived from the insurance
coverage and, thus, increases the size of the premium the consumer
would be willing to pay.
In addition to the monetary loss, if the creditor imposes remedies
against a consumer, this action may hinder that consumer's ability to
obtain credit in the future. To some lenders a deficiency judgment or
repossession on a consumer's credit record indicates excessively high
default risk. Thus, another component of Lis the damage to creditworthiness that a consumer perceives when a remedy is imposed. A
portion of this perceived damage is captured by considering the consumer's attitude toward the remedy. Presumably, consumers who
consider the use of a particular remedy to be so restrictive that it
should be banned by law would perceive that its imposition would
severely damage their credit-worthiness. This would increase the loss,
L, more than would a remedy that the consumer found generally
acceptable. It is thus hypothesized that consumers are likely to pay a
higher premium for contractual protection from what they consider
to be an unacceptable remedy, given the perceived higher benefit
from the insurance.
Further, those consumers who are in the stages of their lives when
the use of credit is greater may perceive more damage from having a
remedy on their credit records. Thus, it is hypothesized that they also
would be willing to pay a higher premium to protect their creditworthiness than consumers who use less credit for consumption.
Finally, the likelihood that a remedy would be exercised, and therefore appear on a credit history, is influenced by the legal environment
of the consumer's home state. In those states where lenders are
restricted from exercising a particular remedy, it is expected that an
informed consumer would be less willing to pay for protection from
its use. A second legal aspect is the existence of a binding usury ceiling. Peterson (1986) and others have shown that lenders operating in
this restricted rate environment are more likely to make use of permitted remedies quickly. Thus, it is hypothesized that an informed
consumer would be more willing to pay for protection from creditor

remedies in those states with relatively low loan rate ceilings. Also,
since lenders faced with binding rate ceilings typically require higher
minimum loan amounts, the component of L that includes the
amount of the defaulted loan could be higher in those states. Thus,
consumers may be willing to pay more for protection.
The discount factor, DIS, is related to the relative value a consumer places on current versus future consumption. The more highly
a consumer values current consumption, the larger the opportunity
cost of foregoing it until later and the smaller the discount factor
needed to bring future monetary values to the present. Thus, the
present value of a future loss is smaller to the individual who values
current consumption more highly. As this loss, calculated in equation
(1), decreases, it commands a lower insurance premium.
To reiterate, it is proposed that the up-front premium which an
individual will pay for protection against the imposition of a creditor
remedy is the expected present value of the loss that is avoided by
purchase of the insurance. This value is positively related to the
potential loss to the debtor, the subjective probability of delinquency
or default, the existence of a binding rate ceiling in the local credit
market, and the discount factor. It is negatively related to both the
consumer's belief that the remedy is acceptable and the degree to
which a remedy is restricted or prohibited.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

The data used in the analysis are unique-taken from households
surveyed in four local credit markets that differed significantly in
their legal environments. 4 The 3,572 households were interviewed in
early 1979 and resided in Little Rock/North Little Rock, Arkansas;
Racine/Kenosha, Wisconsin; Waukegan/North Chicago, Illinois;
and Lake Charles, Louisiana. These areas had similar demographic
and economic characteristics. But at the time of the survey, the
Arkansas and Wisconsin markets had generally lower consumer loan
rate ceilings than the other two. Further, the use of creditor remedies
was more restricted in Wisconsin and Louisiana than in Arkansas
and Illinois.'
'The data are derived from the 1979 National Science Foundation Consumer Survey, conducted by the Credit Research Center, Purdue University.
'The levels of the rate ceilings in 1979 can be obtained from the authors on request. See
Exhibit 2 of the Appendix for a description of the remedy restrictions across the four markets.

TABLE I
Mean Dollar Amount Consumers Are Willing to
Pay for Protection from Creditor Remedies

Overall

Late Fees

Repossession

Attorney's
Fees

Deficiency
Judgement

$47

$132

$112

$ 93

40

105
116
116
113
107
140

83
112
108
84
84
109

110
105
117
136

75
79
198

Life Cycle Stage
< 45 and married
< 45 and single
Single parent
Married parent
;;;. 45, working
;;;. 45, not in labor force

42
42
41
71

102
160
160
102
119
175

Credit Market
Wisconsin
111inois
Arkansas
Louisiana

39
39
47
88

84
109
148
292

55

%

Expect trouble repaying debts

52

183

141

114

No trouble repaying debts

40

111

103

84

In a section of the survey devoted to attitudes about credit, consumers were asked their opinions of ten creditor remedies (see
Exhibit 3 of the Appendix). They were then presented with a hypothetical loan situation and asked what amount, in the form of a onetime up-front charge, they would be willing to pay for a written
agreement granting protection from each of four of the remedies (see
Exhibit 3 of the Appendix for details). It was implicitly assumed that
no transactions or information costs were involved in the agreement.
The four remedies were repossession, the assessment of late charges,
the assessment of creditor's attorney's fees, and the award of deficiency judgments. 6
The average dollar amounts consumers were willing to pay for protection from each remedy, both overall and for various subgroups,
are reported in Table 1. About one-third of the respondents who
were willing to pay a premium were unable to state an amount.

'Consumers' rankings of the listed remedies in order of general acceptance were such that.
the charging of late fees ranked first, repossession second, the assessment of the attorney's fees
sixth, and deficiency judgments eighth out of ten possibilities. Of these four remedies, all but
deficiency judgments were ranked in the top four preferred by creditors. See Tables 2 and 3 in
Peterson (1986) for these rankings.

!

Examination of the mean amounts indicates that Louisiana residents
and those expecting to have trouble repaying their debts place a
higher value on protection from each remedy than do citizens of
other states and those not expecting trouble, respectively. The overall
mean amount respondents were willing to pay for late fees, $47, suggests that consumers are willing to agree to a .694 percentage point
increase in the annual percentage rate of interest (APR) on the hypothetical loan to obtain a contract that limits these fees to $1 instead of
$5 per late payment.' Barth, Cordes, and Yezer (1986) found that
consumers were willing to pay an additional .045 points APR per one
dollar decrease in the maximum late charge allowed per month.
Thus, our results support their findings for this remedy. Similarly,
the overall averages for attorney's fees and deficiency judgments
result in an increase of 1.704 and 1.408 points APR, respectively.
These results are also consistent with the findings of Barth, Cordes,
and Yezer (1986). However, regression analysis of the reported premiums generally yielded statistically insignificant results. 8 Therefore,
it appears that at this point the hypotheses summarized at the end of
the previous section are not supported.
The fact that approximately one-third of the respondents who
stated a willingness to pay were unable to give an amount indicates
the presence of an unspecifiable threshold level below which there is
no definitive answer regarding the premium. Such a situation suggests the need for a qualitative response model. 9 In addition, the lack
of any clear pattern in the mean amounts and the paucity of readily
available market data on the value of protection must cause one to
wonder whether consumers have enough information to estimate the

'This figure is determined by subtracting the APR of the hypothetical loan without protection from the corresponding figure when the insurance is purchased. The 48 month $4,000 loan
without contractual protection from the $5 late fee has an APR of approximately 12.015. The
APR with insurance is determined by assuming the same loan and payment situation but with,
in the case of late fees, a $47 up-front charge. This gives an APR of 12.709. Thus, the difference of .694 is reported. This difference obviously depends upon a number of factors (e.g.,
the term of the loan) and is offered only as a rough comparison with Barth, Cordes, and Yezer
(1986). A similar procedure is followed for attorney's fees and deficiency judgments. Barth,
Cordes, and Yezer did not consider repossession of the purchased good, althugh bans on real
estate and general security inretests were included.
'These results are not reported here but are available from the authors on request.
'By adopting the appropriate normalization for the parameters of such a model, the
unknown threshold can be set equal to zero (see Amemiya 1981). The authors would like to
thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.

cost to them of the imposition of a remedy reasonably. 10 While consumers may be unable to give an amount, this does not preclude the
possibility that they can indicate whether protection has any positive
value to them. Thus, for the above reasons the primary analysis
focuses on the qualitative question of whether consumers are willing
to pay for contractual protection at all, not on the amount of the
payment.
To analyze the discrete choice problem of whether consumers are
willing to pay for contractual protection from creditor remedies, a
binary logit model was selected. This model determines the probability that an individual with a given set of attributes will make one
choice rather than the alternative. The binary dependent variable
took the value of one if the consumer placed a positive value on protection from the particular remedy and zero otherwise. 11 The questions which asked the respondents to ascertain this value and the
hypothetical loan situation to which it applied are shown in Exhibit 3
of the Appendix. The explanatory variables are measures of those
factors which compose equation (1).
The debtor's subjective probability of delinquency or default,
PrD, was measured by whether the respondent expected to have trouble repaying debt commitments in the following year or two. To
quantify this expectation a binary variable, DEF, was created. This
variable took the value of one if the consumer admitted that chances
of repayment problems were "very" or "somewhat" likely and zero
if the chances were "not very" or "not at all" likely. 12 The question
utilized in constructing DEF is contained in Exhibit 3 of the Appendix. As implied in the theoretical discussion above, the coefficient
associated with DEF is expecte~ to be positive.
The hypothetical loan situation in the survey artificially fixed the
actual monetary loss incurred by the consumer if the remedy was
imposed. Because, for any particular remedy, this value did not vary
across the sample, it was not included in the analysis. Other comThe first phenomenon may also be attributed to the brevity of the questions asked, the
hypothetical nature of the situation presented, and the fact that the questions were asked near
the end of the lengthy survey.
"In other words, the dependent variable took the value of one for those consumers who
stated an amount and for those who could not state the exact amount they would pay as a premium, but did say they would pay something.
"A continuous variable measuring this subjective probability is desirable, but is not available from the data base.
10

I

ponents of the loss, L, were estimated. To capture a portion of the
perceived damage to credit-worthiness when a remedy is imposed,
this study includes a measure of the consumer's attitude about the
acceptability of a remedy. Respondents were asked whether lenders
should be permitted to use a particular remedy in the case of delinquency or default. If an individual believed the creditor should not be
permitted to use the remedy, the variable A TT was assigned the value
one, zero otherwise. (The question needed to construct this predictor
is presented in Exhibit 3 of the Appendix.) The coefficient of this
variable is also expected to be positive.
Another portion of the perceived damage to credit-worthiness was
captured by a measure of the life-cycle stage of the debtor household.
This was accomplished by creating four binary variables. For those
households in their family formation years, consisting of young (less
than 45 years of age) married couples, FAMILY took a value of one,
zero otherwise. YGSNG and SNGPAR were similarly constructed
for young single people with no children in the home and for single
parents of any age, respectively. The variable OLDWRK took the
value one for those households headed by older people still in the
labor force. Households headed by older people who were either
retired or otherwise not in the labor force were left in the constant. It
is expected that this last group of older households, with lower
demand for credit, should be less concerned about their abilities to
obtain credit in the future. Thus, insurance protection from the
damaging of their credit-worthiness is less valuable and commands
little or no premium. This suggests that the coefficients of each of the
included variables should be positive.
The legal setting of the consumer's local credit market was also
accounted for in the analysis. The variable RR took a value of one
for the two markets where the creditor remedy was restricted or prohibited, zero otherwise. Given the binding rate ceilings on consumer
credit in Wisconsin and Arkansas at the time of the survey, the
variable LRC took a value of one for these two markets, zero otherwise. In light of earlier theoretical discussion, the coefficient of RR is
expected to be negative and that of LRC positive.
Capital market t~~ory is used to derive a proxy for the discount
factor of equation (l). Capital markets and the ability to borrow and
lend resources free an individual's consumption pattern from the
constraint of present income earnings. In particular, the ability to use
credit allows individuals today to consume more than is allowed by

current income alone. It is hypothesized that the value of current versus future consumption is higher and, thus, the discount factor is
smaller for consumers who have larger amounts of debt relative to
income. The ratio of outstanding consumer installment debt to
household income, denoted DEBTRAT, was created to measure this
consumer preference. This debt measure included revolving credit
card debt but excluded credit card obligations paid in full each
month, as well as other lines of credit, rent, and mortgage payments.
Because an increase in DEBTRA T implies a decrease in the discount
factor, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative.
A summary of the independent variables is provided below:
DEF
ATT

FAMILY

YGSNG
SNGPAR
OLDWRK

RR
LRC
•DEBTRAT

l respondent "very" or "somewhat" likely to have trouble
repaying debt, 0 if "not very" or "not at all" likely,
l belief of respondent is that creditor should not be permitted
to use remedy, 0 otherwise,
l respondent < 45 and married, 0 otherwise,
I respondent < 45 and single without children, 0 otherwise,
1 respondent is single parent, 0 otherwise,
1 respondent ;;. 45 and in labor force, 0 otherwise,
I remedy is restricted or prohibited in market, 0 otherwise,
1 for Wisconsin and Arkansas markets, 0 otherwise, and
outstanding consumer installment debt/hottsehold income.

The results of the logit estimation are presented in Table 2. 13 The
overall fit of the model can be evaluated by the likelihood ratio statistic, - 2logh. This statistic is distributed as a chi square (r), where r
equals the number of explanatory variables. Similar to the F test in
ordinary regression analysis, this statistic tests the null hypothesis
that all coefficients are zero. As reported in Table 2, this hypothesis
is rejected at the 95 percent level of confidence. Further, for each of
the four equations, the full logit model correctly predicts about twothirds of the consumers' choices.
The asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood parameter
estimates allow the use of t-tests for the coefficients of explanatory
variables. Given the binary nature of each variable, a positive (negative) significant coefficient indicates that the likelihood that a consumer would pay for protection from the remedy is greater (less)
when the variable takes the value of one than when it takes the value
of zero.
''See McFadden ( 1974) for a derivation of this model and the test statistics associated with it.

TABLE 2
Determinants of Consumers' Willingness to Pay for
Contractual Protection from Creditor Remedies"
Dependent Variables
Late Fees

Repossession

Attorney's
Fees

Deficiency
Judgment

DEF

0.16•
(4.63)

0.68•
(5.07)

0.47•
(3.07)

0.74•
(5.41)

ATT

0.21•
(2.51)

0.30•
(2.89)

0.06
(0.57)

0.28•
(2.74)

FAMILY

0.06
(0.44)

0.08
(0.58)

0.30•
(1.66)

-0.09
(0.60)

YGSNG

0.55•
(3.11)

0.42°
(2.35)

0.95°
(4.53)

0.34*
(1.83)

SNGPAR

0.28
(I.53)

0.29
(I.54)

0.44•
(1.94)

0.12
(0.64)

OLDWRK

-0.01
(0.04)

-0.ll
(0.73)

0.24
(1.25)

-0.17
(1.08)

RR

-0.23•
(2.49)

-0.24•
(2.55)

-0.29°
(2.64)

-0.27*
(2.70)

LRC

0.12
(1.35)

0.19*
(1.98)

0.19°
(1.76)

0.16
(1.51)

DEBTRAT

-0.00
(0.45)

-0.00
(0.50)

-0.00
(0.05)

-0.00
(0.86)

Constant

1.22•
(8.87)

1.22•
(8.79)

1.66•
(9.49)

1.30"
(8.59)

Independent
Variables

Life Cycle

n

2576

2535

2211

2457

-2log>.

61.5*

75.1 •

51.7*

68.0*

620Jo

630Jo

660Jo

640Jo

OJo correctly

predicted

•The absolute value of the t-ratio is given in parentheses below each estimated coefficient.
•Significant at the 95070 level of confidence, one-tailed test.

For all four remedies the coefficient of DEF is significantly positive and, thus, meets a priori expectations. This indicates that consumers who anticipated having trouble meeting debt commitments
were more willing to pay for protection from these remedies than
those who did not expect such problems.
The attitude variable (ATT) significantly captures consumers' perceived losses from the imposition of remedies. Except for protection
from attorney's fees, those consumers who believed a remedy was
unacceptable were more likely to pay for protection. As expected,
young single persons were more willing to contract for protection
against remedies than households headed by older people not in the
labor force. The coefficients on the other life-cycle variables were not
statistically significant. Additional analysis of this data (not presented here) indicated that these young single consumers were significantly more likely to shop for the best deal before signing a credit
contract.
Holding all other factors constant, consumers borrowing in markets where the imposition of remedies was restricted were less willing
to pay for protection from the remedies. In partial accord with prior
expectation, the presence of binding rate ceilings has a significantly
positive effect on consumers' willingness to contract for protection
from repossession and the payment of attorney's fees, but they have
no effect for the other two remedies.
The variable DEBTRAT is insignificant for all remedies. This suggests that the discount factor is not an empirically important variable. Several alternatives to DEBTRAT were also utilized, with similar
results.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the consumers' view of
restrictions on remedies imposed by lenders in case of delinquency or
default on a loan contract. In particular, we chose to investigate what
factors influence the value consumers place on protection from these
creditor actions.
Although we were unable to capture the determinants of how
much consumers would be willing to pay for protection, analysis of
their willingness to pay yielded significant results. This analysis
implied that the consumers in our sample were aware of the factors
which affect the cost they would incur when a remedy is exercised.

For instance, consumers who acknowledged a higher risk of default
were more willing to pay for protection from creditor remedies,
under the realization that the remedial action was more likely to be
imposed.
The sample data were drawn from credit markets that differed in
the level of interest rate ceilings and restrictions of remedies. With
this data we ascertained that consumers seem aware of the legal
environment that influences the imposition of remedies. In sum, we
found evidence that, in the absence of transactions costs, some consumers recognized a positive value of protection from creditor
remedies, while others found no need for it. Further, the former were
willing to pay lenders to obtain such protection.
However, as indicated by the analysis of how much they would pay
for protection from creditor remedies, consumers may be unable to
appraise the potential harm of such creditor action. Such imperfect
borrower knowledge could be corrected through public education or
through legislation which mandates that lenders provide more complete information themselves.
APPENDIX

EXHIBIT 1

Assume that, on a three month loan, a consumer estimates that a
$1,000 loss, L, is incurred if a default occurs at any time during the
term of the loan. This $1,000 includes both the monetary loss and
any damage to the debtor's credit-worthiness. The consumer believes
that there is only a ten percent probability that the loan will be
defaulted at some time during the term of the contract. In the event
of default, there is a 50 percent chance that it will happen during the
first month, a 30 percent chance and a 20 percent chance it will happen during the second and third months, respectively.
Given a twelve percent annual discount rate-that is, the consumer
is indifferent between $100 today and $112.68 in one year (assuming
monthly compounding)-the expected present value of the loss from
default is
.10[.50(.990 x $1000) + .30(.980 x $1000) + .20(.971 x $1000)) = $98.32

The consumer would benefit by $98.32 if this loss could be avoided.

EXH/B/T2
Creditor Remedy Restrictions in Survey States in 1979
State
Restriction

Arkansas

Illinois

Louisiana

Overall level of
restrictions

Not highly
restrictive

Not highly
restrictive

Highly restrictive Highly restrictive

Late payment
charges

No provision

Lesser of $10 or
Slllo

Lesser of max.
rate, 3117o or $5

Repossession

Self-help allowed Self-help allowed "Sequestration"
under UCC
requires replevin
under UCC
by legal
authority

Requires prior
judicial process

Assessment of
attorney's fees

Limited to 101170
of principal +
interest

Reasonable fees
allowed

Up to 25117o of
balance due

Prohibited in
consumer credit

Deficiency
judgments

Allowed under

Allowed but
may not be
available in
some cases

No provision but Prohibited for
recovery of
loans under
deficiencies is
Sl,000
prohibitively
expensive

ucc

Wisconsin

Lesser of $3 or
3117o

Source: Peterson and Falls (1981), "Costs and Benefits of Restrictions on Creditors'
Remedies," Working Paper No. 41, Credit Research Center, Purdue University.

EXHIBIT3
Questions on Consumers' Attitudes Towards Remedies

Sometimes people have difficulty in paying their debts and fall
behind in their payments. When this happens, creditors have several
courses of action that they may follow. In your opinion, which of
these should a creditor be permitted to do to collect a debt that is
owed? To ascertain consumer attitudes they were then asked:
Charge an extra fee if payments are late by 30 days or more?
Renegotiate the loan with lower monthly payments, but at a higher
interest rate?
Call the consumer at regular intervals to remind him that the debt
must be paid?
Contact the consumer's employer about the debt owed?
Take back the item purchased on credit?

Take back and sell the item purchased, then sue for any amount
owed but not covered by the sale?
If no particular item was purchased with the loan, take household

goods and sell them to pay off the debt?
Ask an employer to take part of the consumer's wages to pay off
the debt?
Legally force the consumer to pay the creditor's legal fees if the
creditor has to sue?
Legally force the consumer to use money in savings accounts to
pay off the debts?
Questions on Consumers' Willingness to Pay for Remedy Protection

At times some people have difficulty repaying loans. This could
happen because of unexpected layoffs, job losses, sickness, death, or
family financial problems. When people fall behind on their payments, lenders ·may use a number of legal "remedies" to try and get
their money back. We are interested in how much extra money people might be willing to pay in order to borrow money from a lender
who agreed in writing that he would not use certain "remedies" in
collecting money owed.
Suppose you borrowed $4,000 for 48 months for a new car. You
would have to pay back approximately $1,000 in finance charges on
the loan in addition to the $4,000 borrowed. To ascertain how much
consumers would be willing to pay for protection from the assessment of the lender's attorney's fees, they were asked:
How much extra in a one-time charge or fee would you be willing
to pay to borrow from a lender who would give you a loan contract that would not make you pay his attorney's fees (which might
be as much as $300) if he had to sue you to collect on the loan?
To ascertain how much consumers would be willing to pay for protection from paying late charges, they were asked:
Many lenders can assess "late charges" if your payment is more
than two weeks late. If a lender would agree to assess a late charge
of $1 rather than $5 for each payment overdue, how much extra

would you be willing to pay in a one-time charge or fee to obtain a
$4,000, 48-month loan from such a lender?
If a borrower stopped paying on an auto loan when he still owed
$2,000 and the car was worth only $1,500, the lender can take back
the car and then sue for the extra $500. To ascertain how much consumers would be willing to pay for protection from repossession,
they were asked:

How much extra would you be willing to pay in a one-time charge
or fee to obtain a $4,000, 48-month new car loan from a lender
who agreed that if you stopped paying, he could only sue for the
balance due on the loan ($2,000) but could not take back the car?
To ascertain how much consumers would be willing to pay for protection from the awarding of a deficiency judgment to lenders, they
were asked:
Now, suppose the lender agreed that if the borrower stopped paying, the lender would only take back the car (worth $1,500) but
would not sue for the difference ($500). How much extra in a onetime charge or fee would you pay for such an agreement?
Questions on Consumers' Subjective Probability of Default

How likely do you think it is that you might have trouble repaying
some of your debts in the next year or two. Would you say it is ...
Very likely
Somewhat likely
Not very likely
Not at all likely
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